Income tax evasion by small firms has been seldom investigated mostly because of lack of data. In this paper we use a large data set produced by the Italian Revenue Agency for this project to analyse a recent policy to contrast business income tax evasion. Since 1998 Italy has adopted a method to audit small businesses (Studi di Settore), which defines the probability of a tax audit based on presumptive and reported levels of sales. In 2007 a letter campaign was implemented by the Italian Revenue Agency aimed at reducing manipulation of reports by threatening that if the "anomaly"was repeated with the 2008 tax declaration, the probability of a thorough tax audit would have drastically increased. By using difference in difference with matching methods on a sample of about 50,000 treated firms and 95,000 controls, we find that the letter campaign had a positive and statistically significant average effect on treated firms. A cost-benefit analysis of the policy suggests that the letter campaign generated a net increase of revenues of about 140 million euros.
Introduction
The literature on tax evasion has focused for long exclusively on individuals. More recently, firms' tax evasion has been the subject of a literature which adapts the Allingham-Sandmo setup by assuming a profit maximising firm that chooses the level of sales and evasion under the constraint of a costly concealment technology. For large corporations this literature has been enriched embodying agency considerations (Crocker and Slemrod, 2005) and the role of the tax specialists (Lipatov, 2012) , showing that the cost of concealment can be high. For small firms, concealment costs tends to be lower, for instance because of smaller "whistleblowing threat" posed by firms' employees (Kleven et al., 2009 ). These insights seem in line with some stylized facts, namely the "U-shaped" noncompliance rate for corporations relative to their size (Slemrod, 2007) and the positive correlation between the size of the shadow economy and the share of small firms in some OECD countries (Greece, Italy, Spain). For these reasons, research into the determinants of (small) firms' tax compliance is relevant in policy terms.
Since 1998 Italy has adopted a method to audit small businesses (firms, on which we focus here and professionals) known as Studi di settore (Sds). Relating this to other audit methods known in the literature, Sds is relative audit rule as defined by Bayer and Cowell (2009) , i.e. a rule where the probability of audit of a particular firm depends on that firm's observable behaviour relative to others operating in the same market. However, Bayer and Cowell (2009) assume that the probability is exogenous, while, within Sds, the probability of audit depends on taxpayer's reports. More precisely, within Sds the probability of audit is increasing in presumptive and decreasing in reported level of sales. The value of presumptive sales is obtained in two steps. First, the Revenue Agency (RA) estimates the weighted average productivity of a set of selected inputs within the economic branch of operation of the firm, using the information provided by a subset of firms whose reports are deemed to be reliable. This yields a vector of estimated productivity parameters. Second, the value of inputs is reported by the taxpayer and presumptive sales are obtained through multiplication of the vector of productivity parameters by the vector of inputs. A firm whose value of reported sales is not lower than the presumptive one is said to be congruous and is less likely to be audited. However, as the vector of productivity parameters is known to the taxpaying firms at the time it is asked to report inputs, the method is prone to manipulation by firms who can lower presumptive sales, and thus audit probability, by underreporting the value of selected inputs.
For the period 1998-2005, the method was implemented by the Italian RA without paying much attention to this manipulation bias. As a result, the frequency of discrepancies between reported and presumptive sales decreased remarkably through time, and this was interpreted, rather than as a sign of increased compliance, as the direct consequence of the intense manipulation activity 1 . Since 2005, the RA has undertaken a number of administrative actions. Among these, we consider the initiative known as Comunicazioni anomalie studi di settore (Communications on anomalies concerning Studi di settore) which was implemented in tax year 2007. It consisted in sending a letter to 112,000 firms which allegedly manipulated their reports, according to information available at the RA, informing them that some input data they reported for tax year 2007 were seen as 'anomalous' and that such an anomaly, if not corrected for tax year 2008, would cause the inclusion of the firm in a list of taxpayers to be audited. The campaign seemingly had a remarkable impact on input reports. Overall, 71.7% of businesses which received the letter did not report any anomaly in 2008, so that the campaign was deemed successful in reducing manipulation. However, Sds is designed to elicit truthful sales reports, and taxes are ultimately paid on profits.
The objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of the letter on sales and profit reports, i.e on firms' tax compliance. To do this, we first develop a simple model of firm's choice which is based on that by Kleven et al. (2011) . This model shows that, provided the letter increase the value of reported inputs, it also generates an increase in reported sales, although the likelihood and magnitude of such an increase depend on the convexity of the probability function. On the empirical side, we examine the firms' response to the letter using a large data base of firms' tax reports produced by the RA for this project. We observe data of 51,000 firms in year 2007 and 2008, i.e. immediately before and after the letter was sent. We are also given analogous data for the same sample of firms relating to 2006 tax year and a random sample of 95,000 non-treated firms, which we use as controls upon applying statistical matching techniques conditioning on observable characteristics in 2006, before the campaign was implemented.
Results provide evidence of a strong and significant average effect of the letter on treated firms' input reports, a relatively smaller effect on sales and a significant effect on reported taxable profits. A back-of-the envelope calculation suggests that, on average, reported taxable profits without the letter would have been lower by approximately e7,200 per firm which corresponds to approximately 160 millions of taxes on the entire population of treated firms. These absolute numbers should be contrasted to the low administrative costs of the campaign and they suggest a net positive revenue of the adopted policy. Moreover, results appear to be consistent with the theoretical model, providing evidence that changes in the perceived probability of audit influence compliance by small firms. This paper contributes to the existing literature analysing the effect of similar "threatening" letters on taxpayers behaviour, presenting mixed results. For instance, Blumenthal et al. (2001) and Slemrod et al. (2001) find almost-negative impact and whereas Fellner et al. (2009) and Kleven et al. (2011) find positive direct impacts and Pomeranz (2012) finds positive but indirect impacts on firms that are involved in a VAT chain with the firm receiving the letter.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the related literature. Section 3 describes Sds-based probability of audit and Section 4 derives some theoretical insights by modelling the letter campaign as a change in the probability of audit perceived by taxpayers. Section 5 is devoted to data description, while Section 6 describes the empirical approach and presents main results. Section 7 discusses results and provides some some calculations on cost and benefits of the adopted policy.
Related literature
In recent years, a number of papers have been written on the impact of letters sent by Tax Agencies to enhance compliance. The reliance on field experiments is indeed mentioned as an element of the credibility revolution in the empirical analysis of tax evasion (Slemrod and Weber, 2012) . The Minnesota experiment, illustrated in Blumenthal et al. (2001) and in Slemrod et al. (2001) is the starting point of this literature. The purpose of this experiment was to test the impact on compliance of three different kind of letters: a 'warning' letter and two letters appealing to 'tax morale' arguments (Support Valuable Services and a Joint the Compliant Majority letters). In the first of these, a sample of 1700 taxpayers (treated sample) who filed a tax return for year 1993 was randomly extracted from the population of Minnesota taxpayers. Taxpayers included in the treated sample received a letter warning them that their tax returns for year 1994 would be 'closely examined'. Their reporting behaviour was then compared to that of a control sample formed by approximately 23,000 taxpayers extracted from the population of Minnesota taxpayers. Main results of this experiment are overall quite deceptive. A partially significant positive impact of the letter in terms of average reported incomes (and taxes) for some of the subgroups, namely those with low and average incomes, is offset by a very low impact among taxpayers whose opportunity to evade is low and even a significant negative impact of the letter on average reported incomes (and taxes) for the group of high-income taxpayers. Moreover, there is a lack of significance of almost all regression coefficients in both samples.The impact of the two letters appealing to 'tax morale' arguments was also overall negligible according to Slemrod et al. (2001) .
After Minnesota experiment, the use of letters to enhance compliance has been the subject of various studies. In Fellner et al. (2009) different kinds of letters were sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. The deterrence effect was found to be strong for letters threatening a higher detection probability, but not significant for letters appealing to "tax morale" arguments or imparting information about others' behaviour. In Kleven et al. (2011) the results of a two-step experiment conducted on Danish taxpayers are analyzed. In the first step, taxpayers are divided into 2 groups: a first who is audited on their tax returns for tax year 2006 without being previously alerted and a second group who is not audited. In the second part of the experiment, which concerns tax returns for tax year 2007, dependent workers belonging to both groups are divided into 3 new groups: a first group of taxpayers who receives a letter stating that they will surely be audited (100%-letter); a second group who receives a letter stating that they will be audited with a percentage of 50% and a third group who does not receive any letter. Limiting our attention to the results concerning the impact of the letters on income reported in the second experiment. The main finding of the paper is that such an impact is positive and significant, and, in particular, that it is higher for employees who were not audited in the first part of the experiment.
All these papers deal with the impact of letters on compliance by individual taxpayers. A closer reference to our paper is Pomeranz (2012) , who looks at VAT compliance by Chilean firms. VAT is believed to facilitate enforcement through a built-in incentive structure that generates a third-party reported paper trail on transactions between firms. Thus, increased tax enforcement on one firm may generate spillovers to its trading partners up the VAT chain. The paper tests this self-enforcement hypothesis by means of two experiments (Letter Message and Spillover experiments). Overall, these two experiments show that for a given firm, the VAT paper trail acts as a substitute to the firm's own audit probability, and globally the paper trail acts as a complement to the audit probability, since its effectiveness gets multiplied through the spillover effects. Although the goal of these experiments is not to measure the overall effect of the letter on firm compliance, it provides an important test of the VAT self-enforcement hypothesis, which is relevant to understand firms' compliance behaviour.
Since 1998, Italy has adopted Sds to audit businesses (firms and professionals) conducting an economic activity on a small scale, i.e. reporting an annual volume of sales below e7,500,000. Sds can be seen as a method to base the audit probability function on the comparison between presumptive and reported sales 2 To describe it, we first focus on the derivation of presumptive sales for each business and then on the characterization of the audit probability function.
The RA collects information on structural variables (e.g., size of offices and warehouses, number of employees, main characteristics of customers and providers, etc.) and on accounting variables (mainly referring to the amount and the cost of inputs). All these variables enter the formula to compute Sds and we will call them Sds input (or simply input) for brevity.
Let us now use some notation for describing the Sds auditing scheme. First of all, the RA, after dividing business sectors into C clusters and allocating each firm to a single cluster, selects within each cluster c = {1, 2, ..., C} the group of firms that it believes to be reliable, R c ⊆ I c , in year t, where I c is the subgroup of the total population I belonging to cluster c, where ∪I c = I. Hence, it estimates c relationships: y c,r,t−3 = β c,t−3 x c,r,t−3 + c,r,t−3
(1) r ∈ {1, ...R c }, x c,r,t−3 is the J ×R c matrix of inputs at time t−3, y c,r,t−3 is the value of sales reported by firm r at time t − 3, and c,r,t−3 is an idiosyncratic error of firm r, belonging to cluster c,in period t−3, respectively. β c,t−3 is the J × 1 vector of unknown productivity parameters for cluster c, which -once estimated by using standard regression techniques -is denoted β c,t−3 . Finally, the RA defines the J × R c vector of productivity parameters coefficient at time t as b c,t := β c,t−3 . Hence, presumptive sales for firm i belonging to the population of active firms in cluster c and tax year t are calculated as y cit = b ct x cit although firms are also required to declare their level of sales y cit . Notice that reported input (x cit ) and sales (y cit ) of firm i can differ from their true values, which we denote by x cit and y cit , respectively. Clearly the RA does not know the true value of inputs nor of sales and at most it can infer on their presumptive values.
We write the cluster c−firm i's perceived probability to be audited as
where s is the signal reported by the firm to the RA, which is a function of reported input and sales. At this stage we do not specify a functional form, and we only assume that p is increasing in presumptive sales and decreasing in reported sales.
The relationship between y cit , b ct and x cit defines the congruity status of the firm: a firm is said to be incongruous (incongrua) when y cit < b ct x cit and congruous (congrua) when y cit ≥ b ct x cit , so that an incongruity dummy D cit for firm i in cluster c, in period t is defined as follows:
To complete the description, a fundamental piece of information concerns the timing of the game. For reasons discussed in (Santoro, 2008) , Sds has been designed so that b ct is fully known when x cit is reported by firm i. In practice, firms are asked to report input and sales values using a freely downloadable software (known as Ge.ri.co), which contains full information on the value of each element of b ct . By using this software, any firm i ∈ c, for all {i, c} can try different values of (x ci , y ci ) to minimize expected tax payments.
Typically, firms choose the vector of input to declare x ci , and -using the provided Ge.ri.co software -they assess the corresponding level of presumptive sales (b c x ci ), which they need to declare to be congruous. At this stage, firms can go back defining a different level of input to declare and assess how much the presumptive level of sales would change and this procedure can go on at the firms' will, although a minimum feasible level 3 of input values to be reported can be assumed. It is a matter of fact that the distribution of declared over presumptive input is highly concentrated around 1.
This input manipulation activity is the primary target of the letter campaign that we examine in this paper. At the beginning of 2009, i.e some months before issuing their tax reports referring to tax year 2008, approximately 112,000 businesses (firms and professionals) received a letter from the RA informing them that: a) some input reports (x ji ) they made for tax year 2007 were deemed to be "anomalous"; b) if this anomaly or a similar one was repeated for tax year 2008, i would certainly be included in a list of firms to be audited.
The letter was sent only to all firms which, according to the information available to the RA, allegedly manipulated input data in 2007. Firms that had already been audited or that received similar letter prior to 2007 were excluded from this letter campaign regardless of their behaviour.
The model
The purpose of this Section is to model firm's choices and to provide some possible interpretations of empirical results. The main literature on tax evasion by firms assumes perfect competition and focuses on the choice of sales given marginal costs and a fixed audit rule. More recently, Bayer and Cowell (2009) assume that the audit rule is relative, so that the probability to be audited for a single firm is conditional upon the tax declarations of other (comparable) firms. Here we set up a simple model which can be seen as a combination of elements coming from both these streams of literature. We retain the idea of perfect competition and of fixed marginal costs, so that the firm's choice variable is reported output or, equivalently, sales. On the other hand, the audit probability is relative since it depends on other firms' reports as well as on input reports by the same firm. Thus, we assume a two-step decision procedure by firms. First, we assume that the firm reports the minimum feasible level of input values to reduce the value of presumptive sales and, second, that it decides the value of sales (i.e. of output, for a given competitive price) to report. Assuming risk neutrality and a model similar to the one recently proposed (Kleven et al., 2011) , and dropping subscripts for notational convenience, a rational firm will declare the value of sales (y) that maximizes its expected profit (π e ):
where τ is the proportional tax rate and θ is the unitary sanction, s(y) is the value of the signal for a given level of inputs, x, y is the true value of sales.
The first order condition of problem (4) is
The second order condition is
The second order condition puts some restrictions on ∂ 2 p(s)/∂y 2 . Namely, recalling that we assumed ∂p/∂y < 0 and noticing that ( y − y) > 0 for a rational firm, at the optimum it must be that either ∂ 2 p(s)/∂y 2 is positive or, if negative, that it is not smaller than twice the marginal probability with respect to output relative to hidden output (i.e.
). To keep things simple, we treat the signal as a linear function of reported and presumptive sales:
which implies that ∂p/∂s > 0. Using (7) we can rewrite (5) as
Let us now introduce time in our problem, by adding a time subscript to the same variables defined when they are not constant over time, and let us assume that a firm which at time t had underdeclared its inputs receives a shock at time t + 1, for instance a letter threatening an audit if inputs are not correctly reported. Holding the vector of productivity coefficients (b) constant over time, assume this shock induces the firm to alter the vector of declared inputs so to increase its presumptive sales, i.e. x t+1 > x t . What is the reaction in terms of reported sales? By assuming that θ is constant so that the right-hand side of equation (8) is also unchanged over time, the change induced by the letter on the left-hand side of equation (8) must be equal to zero. By writing ∂p/∂s = h(s) and assuming without loss of generality that output is produced with only one input, the total differential of (8) is written as
Using (7) we rewrite (9) as
For an increase in reported inputs (dx > 0), as ∂p/∂s > 0, reported sales have to increase (dy > 0) to satisfy (10) whenever ∂h/∂s ≥ 0, i.e whenever p is a linear or convex function of s. Thus, in these cases, provided that the letter induces the firm to increase reported inputs, it will also induce the firm to increase reported sales. Note that these cases are in line with restrictions required by second order conditions examined above 4 . However, concavity of p with respect to s is still admissible. In such a case, the impact of a dx > 0 is unclear, and consequently, we do not know a priori what is the sign of dy.
To wrap things up, provided that the letter determines an increase in reported input, the letter is more (less) likely to induce an increase in reported sales if the probability of audit is perceived to be convex (concave) in s. Convexity may be associated with the congruity status of the firm. More precisely, a firm which, before receiving the letter, is congruous, i.e. thinks to be in a safe position may perceive the letter as a sharp increase in the probability of audit. In such a case, the impact of the letter should be higher for congruous firms.
Data description
In this paper we use a data set produced by the Italian RA for this project with the aim of estimating the effectiveness of the letter campaign on declared profit and sales. The data set contains a sample of over 51,000 treated and one of nearly 95,000 non-treated firms, which we use as controls.
The sample of treated firms was randomly extracted from a population of approximately 112,000 tax declarations issued by firms and professionals who were suspected to have manipulated inputs in year 2007, according to some indicators developed by the RA and not fully available to taxpayers nor to us. For this sample we have information on: a) a set of characteristics regarding location area (in five major areas, NorthWest, North-East, Center, South, Islands), the business sector, the accounting regime (ordinary or simplified); b) data on costs of inputs, services, costs for purchased services, intermediate goods, inventories, labour services, the number of dependent workers distinguished into full time permanent, full time temporary workers, family and non-family collaborators, as well as declared profit and sales; c) the level of reported sales, the incongruity status, and the type of anomaly recorded into 19 categories, provided by the RA and pointed out in the 4 The derivative ∂ 2 p(s)/∂y 2 is equivalent to ∂g/∂y where g(s) = −h(s). Therefore, the condition ∂ 2 p(s)/∂y 2 ≥ 0 corresponds to −∂h(s)/∂y = ∂h(s)/∂s > 0, i.e to weak convexity of p(s).
letter addressed to taxpayers.
The sample of controls is randomly extracted from a population of over 2.2 millions of firms which were not suspected to have manipulated inputs. For all treated and selected firms we were provided a set of information regarding costs, inputs and other economic and financial variables of these firms. Finally, the same information regarding the very same firms were provided also for the year before (year 2006) and after (year 2008) the treatment, allowing us to build a balanced panel over three years. Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics for the treated and control sample separately, in 2006, the year just before treatment. Treated units are more likely to be located in the South and the Islands and are more likely to use standard accounting methods. Treated firms are also more likely to be operating in the construction and in the trade sectors. As for inventories, it clearly emerges that treated firms have much higher average levels of both beginning and ending inventories, with higher sales but lower profits, while differences in the size of the firms' workforce seem negligible.
Some descriptives on inputs, profits and sales
Letters were sent by the RA to firms which allegedly manipulated some inputs. Although we do not know the exact algorithm used by the RA to select treated firms, we know the type of anomalies identified by the RA. Manipulation is detected by the RA in two ways, a direct and an indirect one. The direct one is based on the observation of anomalous reductions of reported inputs which, in turn, generate reductions in presumptive sales. Main examples of manipulable inputs are the value of capital capital goods and the value of inventory costs or of inventory turnover 5 . To detect manipulation of the inventories, the RA has presumably used the variable of change in inventories, which is inflated by the taxpayer whenever corresponding inputs (inventory costs or inventory turnover) are underreported 6 . The indirect method of detection is based on observation of some anomalous accounting operations, most likely aimed at offsetting the negative impact on taxable profits of underreporting inputs. In fact, inflating the change in inventories reduces inventory costs, which are generally deductible, thus increasing taxable profits However, firms can increase the value of a peculiar accounting variable, so called residual costs (costi residuali ), which collects all costs related to no specific input, without much justification. We then group the original 19 categories of anomalies identified by the RA into 4. They measure the change in inventories, the value of capital goods and the value of residual costs, and a residual, which collects all anomalies which cannot be inserted into any of these. Table 2 presents the transition matrix for these four anomalies. On average, 71.7% of the firm which received the letter removed all anomalies in 2008, i.e. after receiving the letter. The last column reports the distribution of treated firms between different types of anomalies. The diagonal shows the persistency rate, i.e. the percentage of firms treated in 2007 which kept the same anomaly in 2008. It can be seen that, on average, the overall persistency rate, 28.3% is not far from the persistency rate within each type of anomaly, except for the residual category, which we name "other". This is due to the fact that, for the three anomalies identified above, there are few cases of firms which, after the letter, switched to another anomaly. Conversely, the aggregate removal rate, 71.7% is quite close to the removal rate of each of these anomalies, shown in the last column. There clearly are a number of different potential reasons for the choice of removing or not an anomaly upon receipt of the letter, such as the credibility of the letter, the possibility of a mistake by the taxpayer or by the RA, and so on We shall return to this point in Section 7. Table 3 focuses on the impact that the letter had on the value of variables discussed above. These data give some preliminary support to our previous claim that the letter pushed firms to reduce the manipulation of some inputs, as we assumed in Section 4. Finally, Table 4 shows the average difference in sales and profits reported by treated and control firms. Here we refer to profits also since this is a key variable for the evaluation of the impact of letters in policy terms: the benefit of a letter campaign is measured by additional taxes, and taxes are paid on profits. In year 2006 sales are higher and profit is lower for treated firms. In year 2007, treated firms increase their sales only by 1.92%, while untreated firms increase their sales by more than 6%. Moreover, treated firms decrease their profit by more than 11% while untreated firms increase their profit by more than 3.5%. In 2008, i.e. after the letter was sent, treated firms increase their profit by 1.6% despite the ongoing economic crisis, while untreated ones decrease it by more than 5%.
Overall, this analysis suggests that the letter might have had an impact not only on input, but also on sales and profit reports, although, so far, we have no evidence that this was caused by the letter effect.
Empirical strategy
All firms in our dataset that were identified as anomalous according to the RA indicators based on 2007 tax records, received the letter as described above and we aim at identifying what was the average reaction in 2008 tax records following the letter.
According to the anomaly identification rule that the RA adopted -without releasing any detail to the public nor to us -all these firms were identically non-anomalous in 2006, conditional on all observable characteristics. As the only aim of the RA was to maximise tax revenues, reducing input manipulation and increasing tax revenues, all firms identified as possibly anomalous were sent the letter. This poses a challenge to our aim of finding the causal effects of this policy.
Our empirical strategy is twofold. Along with the provision of a random sample of treated firms, we required a random sample of non-treated firms (henceforth named also 'controls', for simplicity). First, we adopt matching techniques to match treated firms with untreated ones, according to their respective characteristics in year 2006, i.e. when none of them show any anomaly according to the RA criteria. This is aimed at pruning treated firms without matches from the control sample, removing the bias derived from estimating the treatment effect using samples which are structurally different in 2007. Second, we use difference-in-difference (DD) methodologies with and without matching to control for before-treatment characteristics. We used two alternative ways of performing matching, namely the coarsened exact matching (CEM) and propensity score matching (PSM) for assessing sensitivity of results to matching methods.
Let us now explain with some more detail the empirical model, starting from a description of the matching methods used ending with the specification of the DD regression equations.
The matching methods
Consider a sample of n units, a subset of a population of N units, where n ≤ N . For unit i, denote T i as the treatment variable, where T i = 1 if unit i receives treatment (and so is a member of the "treated" group) and T i = 0 if not (and is therefore a member of the "control" group). The outcome variable is Z, where Z i (0) is the potential outcome for observation i if the unit does not receive treatment and Z i (1) is the potential outcome if the (same) unit receives treatment. The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is defined as:
For each observed unit, only one potential outcome is observed,
, which means that Z i (0) is unobserved if i receives treatment and Z i (1) is unobserved if i does not receive treatment. Without loss of generality, when we refer to unit i, we assume it is treated so that Z i (1) is observed while Z i (0) is unobserved and thus it is estimated via matching with one or more units from a given reservoir of the control units. We denote byẐ i (0) the estimated counterfactual of Z i (1). Given a set of pre-treatment covariates X i = (X 1i , X 2i , . . . , X ki ) for observation i with T i = 1, matching is a strategy that looks for a set of control units j with T j = 0 and covariates X j such that the distance between X i and X j is the smallest as possible in some metric. If we denote by m T ≤ n T the number of matched units and by M T the set of indexes of matched treated units, an estimator of τ is given by
Matching exactly on X removes theoretically all bias in the estimation of τ . In most applications, exact matching is unfeasible and thus different matching methods have been proposed by the literature. Moreover, not all treated units can be matched, i.e. m T ≤ n T , because there is no reasonable counterfactual in the control units set for a given treated unit. Thus most methods consist in approximate solutions to matching. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) proposed a method called Propensity Score Matching (PSM) which was meant to solve the problem of exact matching in high dimensional covariate space. Let e(X) = P (T = 1|X) be the propensity score, i.e. the probability of receiving the treatment given a set of pre-treatment covariates X. The idea of PSM is that matching on e(X) is simpler than matching on X directly due to the fact that the propensity score is a scalar quantity, moreover, it is possible to prove that matching exactly on e(X) removes all bias. Unfortunately, matching exactly on e(X) is as difficult as matching on X if there is at least one continuous covariate, thus the practice of PSM is to match only approximately on e(X). Further, the true functional form of e(X) is unknown and hence the propensity score is estimated on the data at hands (e.g. via a logit model). This estimateê(X) is highly sensitive to the model specification and so is the matching solution. On the other hand, PSM is supposed to balance the means of the covariates for the treated and control units matched. Usual PSM algorithm are the stratification of the propensity score and nearest method matching. By far, nearest neighbor matching has the best statistical properties (Imbens, 2004) .
Another recent approach is called Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM). The idea of CEM (Iacus et al., 2011) is to coarsen temporarily the covariates X and matching exactly on the coarsened version of those. Coarsening on X corresponds to discretization of continuous variables. In most cases the coarsening is suggested by the data itself. For example, if X 1 corresponds to "years of education", this variable might be coarsened into "grade school", "high school", "college", and "graduate school" as they are observationally equivalent to the purpose of matching.
In other cases automatic coarsening (like automatic methods for drawing histograms) can be applied although, whenever possible, substantive choices of coarsening should be made by the researcher. The results is that treated and control units matched are then all within the intervals specified by the coarsening, and thus the imbalance between matched units is controlled by the coarsening. Coarsening on multiple variables generates strata like in a multiway cross tabulation and matching with CEM occurs within each stratum. In observational studies, the main issue is that the design is not experimental, i.e. the assignment to the treatment is not under the control of the researcher, not randomized, and experiments cannot be replicated. So it is important to consider in-sample properties of a matching method. As matching is supposed to reduce imbalance between treated and control units, one should measure the imbalance left after matching. As PSM is supposed to reduce difference in means, one should compared the average difference in means produces by the different matching methods. Let d(j) be the difference in means for the variable X j among the groups of treated and control units. A way to measure the overall reduction of imbalance after matching is to consider the average absolute difference in means D = 1 J J j=1 |d(j)|, where d(j) is calculated only for numerical variables, while categorical variables can be recoded numerically before evaluation of d(j). In our analysis, categorical variables are matched exactly by all methods, thus the measure D only applies to numerical variables.
The plot in Figure 1 shows the so called spacegraph plot of different randomized matching solutions. The vertical axis shows the imbalance left after matching measured by the average absolute difference in means. The horizontal axis shows the reciprocal of the square root of the number of matching units, which is an indication of variability in the estimate of the treatment effect. The idea of the spacegraph plot is to show the frontier of optimal solutions in the mean squared error (MSE) sense. As matching consists in imbalance reduction at the cost of pruning observation, a natural way to choose among matching solutions is to look at the MSE defined as the square of the bias plus the variance. The graph shows the tradeoff between the imbalance (which induces bias in the estimation of the treatment effect) and the standard error which is proportional to the reciprocal of the number of observation left after pruning.
Indeed, one can match very loosely on e(X) or with very large coarsening and match almost all units (m T n T ) or one can match more strictly but obtain less matched units and hence higher variability in estimation. The plot of Figure 1 shows this trade off. The best solution is on the lowerleft corner of the plot: smallest imbalance and higher number of matched units. The plot reports different CEM solutions obtained by randomizing the coarsening on the covariates X and different PSM solutions where the propensity score is estimated by randomizing the logit model (i.e. including main effects, up to second order interactions and polynomial functions of the covariates). By PSM we mean here a neareast neighbour matching, with calipering, on the estimated propensity score function, where the caliper (i.e. the maximal distance in propensity scores between treated and control units) and the number of nearest (from 1 up to 3 control units per treated unit) are randomly selected for each estimated propensity score model As thousands of random solutions have been generated to obtain this plot, the analysis has been done on a random sample of 2500 observations ("raw" in the picture) from the original data. As it can be seen CEM dominates all PSM solutions in terms of imbalance. Notice further that CEM solutions are much stable compared to the PSM solutions which appear very sensitive to the logit model used to estimate the data. We will however use both methods to assess the robustness of results to the matching method used.
The difference-in-difference model
After dealing with matching issues, we specify a standard difference-in-difference (DD) model:
where T i is a 0/1 indicator for treatment, t t is a dummy variable for year and it is the error term. This model is used for a dependent variable m it which takes different forms, namely log-capital goods, log-change in inventories, log-residual costs, log-sales and log-profit. The coefficient of interest is β 3 . As the theoretical model of Section 4 also predicted that reaction would have Figure 1 : CEM is the best been stronger for incongruous firms, we also estimate the following regression,
where D it is a dummy equal to 1 for incongruous firms and zero otherwise, as defined in (3). The coefficient of interest is γ 7 , providing an estimate of the differential effects on incongruous treated firms. DD regression are estimated with matching by means of weighted regressions, where wheights are provided by the matching procedures described above.
Results
Results of DD regressions (11) about main input aggregates are presented in tables 5-7, those about sales in Table 8 and those about profit in Table  9 . These tables present all the same structure: in columns 1-3 we present the DD estimate considering only years 2007 and 2008, in columns 2-3 we present the DD estimates weighting for CEM and PSM weights, respectively.
In columns 4-6 we consider the whole time-series available where the impact of the treatment can be evaluated with respect to 2006. This is an important comparison since we should recall that 2006 is the year where, according to RA's hypothesis, there was no manipulation. Table 5 shows that the value of capital goods nearly doubled on average after the letter and no much difference arises considering the regressions with matching (coumn 1) and without it (columns 2-3). Columns 4-5 show that after the letter the average value of capital goods remained lower than those declared in 2006 by 15-24% but larger than in 2007.
As for residual costs, Table 6 shows that after the letter the average level decreased by 20-40% compared to 2007 and that the possible effect of the letter was an overshooting as compared with 2006, as the average value decreased by about 20% as opposed to year 2006.
A similar overshooting happened also for the change in inventories. The average level decreased by about 15-17% compared with year 2006, while the average level was increased in year 2007 by a smaller amount, and statistically significant only using CEM matching (Table 7) .
Looking at the effects the letter on reported sales, the first three columns of Table 8 4%. Thus, on average, we can say that the letter had an impact on reported sales in the sense that it reduced their underreporting by approximately 0.6
As for profits, the first 3 columns of Table 9 suggest that, without controlling for 2006, declared profits increased by 3.5-4%. Similarly, the last 3 columns indicate that, when year 2006 is considered as the base year, the treated firm in 2007 decreased their profits on average by 5% while, after treatment, i.e. in 2008, they decreased them only by approximately 1.5%
Finally, we assessed whether results are different depending on firms being incongruous or not. We found that treated incongruous firms had no significantly different behaviour as for reported sales (Table 11 ), whereas they declared on average 3-4% lower profits than treated congruous firms after receiving the letter.
Discussion and concluding remarks
Our description of Sds, along with the theoretical model, provide us with an interpretation of the policy implemented by the Italian RA. In year 2006, according to RA's information, treated firms were not manipulating inputs and, therefore output and profits reports were also correct. In year 2007, however, these firms allegedly manipulated inputs and underreported output and profits. Letters were then sent by the RA to elicit more truthful input reports, with particular regard to input manipulation as revealed by reported values of some key variables (change in inventory, value of capital goods, residual costs) which determine presumptive sales. To the extent that the letter is successful in achieving this objective, and thus in increasing presumptive sales, it is also successful in generating higher sales and profit reports. In turn, if one controls for changes in context and in macro variables, higher sales and profit reports can be interpreted as an increase in tax compliance.
Results confirm, to some extent, the validity of such a reasoning. Main input variables, i.e. those on which more than 95% of letters were based, were significantly manipulated in 2007. More precisely, the value of capital goods was underreported while changes in inventories and residual costs were inflated. Accordingly, sales and profits were significantly underreported by treated firms in 2007. In 2008, i.e. after treatment, all of these manipulations tend to be corrected, with both input and output variables returning to their pre-manipulation (and pre-letter) values, with some "overshooting" effects.
Although results are in line with our expectations, there are several points which deserve a discussion. First, the impact on reported profits seems stronger than that on reported sales. In particular, the change in reported sales is statistically significant only with respect to 2006, but not with respect to 2007 alone. Relatedly, the "surprise" effect of the letter that we conjectured at the end of Section 4, so that congruous firms react more than incongruous one, seems relevant only for profit, but not for sale reports. For example, one could think that, although the signal is formally a function of reported sales, taxpayers perceive the probability to be audited as depending on reported profits. Thus, on average, they reacted by increasing profits more than sales. In turn, this may be explained by firms which, while reducing manipulation, also reduced deductible costs, as treated firms which reacted to the letter by reducing residual costs.
More in general, one should recognize that the observed increase in profits may not necessarily be associated with an increase in tax compliance. For example, an honest taxpayer may be pushed to increase its input reports only because of his risk aversion while, on the contrary, a taxpayer who has manipulated inputs but has not been detected, may increase his manipulation activity because he did not receive the letter. Our model does not consider either attitudes to risk or the possibility of mistakes by the RA or by the taxpayer, so that these (and other) possible factors are ignored. Their potential impact on our estimates can vary. Consider for example a firm which manipulated inputs but did not receive the letter. It is plausible that this firm reacted by further increasing manipulation in 2008. Our estimates, in these cases, are not biased since they are capturing the actual impact of the letter, but some of the potential benefits of the letter campaign, which we will be discussing shortly, may be underestimated. On the other hand, if a firm which received the letter had not manipulated input reports, and thus reacted by keeping the same level of input, the potential impact of the letter is underestimated. Finally, a taxpayer may overreact to the letter, and thus adjust his reports only since he is not sure to be able to prove the honesty of his behaviour. In such a case the potential impact of the letter is overestimated.
At the end of our analysis it is worthwhile looking at social net benefit of such a letter campaign. Gross benefits can be estimated multiplying the net effect of the letter on reported profits by the effective tax rate. Since treated firms reported on average about e24,000 of profits in 2008, and the letter had the effect of incresing their declared pofits by about 3.5%, we estimate that 160 million euros have been collected by treated firms due to the letter effect. The administrative costs of the campaign discussed here are primarily associated with the process of data mining and data processing plus postal costs. Considering that the data had already been processed by the RA, costs are are mainly opportunity costs of human resources devoted to the campaign and thus diverted from other administrative activities. Upon con-fidential information provided by the RA, we estimate these costs to amount approximately to 20 millions of euros, which yields the estimate of a net benefit of approximately 140 millions of euros for the campaign.
The message emerging from our analysis, similarly to Pomeranz (2012) , is that there seems to be some scope for enhancing firms' tax compliance by adopting policies based on the intensive use of administrative databases that are now available to tax administrations. The essential feature of these policies is that they contain a shift of emphasis, and of resources, from ex-post prosecution to ex-ante prevention activities. Such a shift seems particularly suitable in contexts, such as the Italian one, characterized by a very large number of taxpayers who self-report their taxable incomes. Standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
